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“If there is nothing beyond the organic…”
Heredity and Culture at the Boundaries of Anthropology  
in the Work of Alfred L. Kroeber
Maria E. Kronfeldner
“If there is nothing beyond the organic...” Vererbung und Kultur an den Grenzen der Anthropologie bei 
Alfred L. Kroeber
Als Alfred L. Kroeber Anfang des 20. Jahrhunderts daran arbeitete, die Anthropologie als akademische 
Disziplin zu etablieren, definierte er Kultur, aufbauend auf das bereits von seinem Lehrer Franz Boas 
Geleistete, als ein Phänomen sui generis. Damit wollte er nicht zuletzt die aufstrebende Genetik seiner 
Zeit für eine Koalition gegen den damals in Nordamerika vorherrschenden Hereditarianismus gewin-
nen. Das Ziel war, für die Anthropologie einen klar umschriebenen Raum innerhalb der akademischen 
Arbeitsteilung zu schaffen. Um die Grenzlinien dieser Arbeitsteilung zu festigen, überschritt Kroeber 
sie jedoch in Richtung Biologie: Er entwickelte seinen Begriff der Kultur in enger Anlehnung an den 
Begriff der Vererbung – als unabhängig von Vererbung (Kultur als superorganisch) und gleichzeitig als 
analog zu Vererbung (Kultur als neue Art der Vererbung). Im Beitrag werden die prekären Grenzlinien der 
Anthropologie zu Beginn des 20. Jahrhunderts kurz zusammengefasst, um dann Kroebers Ideen zum 
Kulturkonzept zu präsentieren, wobei der Fokus auf den Einfluss gelegt wird, den die veränderte Land-
schaft um den Begriff der Vererbung auf seinen Kulturbegriff hatte. Auf der Grundlage des historischen 
Fallbeispiels werden zwei allgemeine Schlussfolgerungen gezogen: erstens, dass der Begriff der Kultur 
verschiedene Rollen in Erklärungen der menschlichen Existenzweise spielen kann, und zweitens, dass 
der Weismann’sche Begriff der harten Vererbung keine eindeutig einseitige historische Wirkung auf das 
Erstarken des Hereditarianismus zu Beginn des 20. Jahrhunderts in Nordamerika hatte, sondern auch 
einen Kroeber’schen Kulturbegriff zu etablieren half. Kultur konnte damit unabhängig von Vererbung 
gedacht werden.
Schlüsselwörter: Kultur, Vererbung, Kulturanthropologie, superorganisch, harte Vererbung, Alfred L. 
Kroeber, Franz Boas
Keywords: culture, heredity, cultural anthropology, superorganic, hard inheritance, Alfred L. Kroeber, 
Franz Boas.
“If there is nothing beyond the organic, let us quit our false and vain business 
and turn biologists…” said anthropologist Alfred L. Kroeber (1916b: 296) in 
1916 – a time when ideas about heredity were changing profoundly, when 
genetics was establishing itself as an experimental science, when hereditar-
ian thinking was gaining wide acceptance in the US, and – last but not least 
– when American anthropology was emancipating itself from being a mu-
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seum-based profession to become an academic discipline. In face of all this, 
Kroeber was fighting, as his teacher Franz Boas already had, to establish the 
boundaries and autonomy of the new academic discipline of anthropology, 
especially the boundaries and autonomy of cultural anthropology. Not sur-
prisingly, this struggle involved strong opposition to certain kinds of heredi-
tarian thinking and a divide within the field of anthropology that in general 
exists within academia, broadly speaking between the natural sciences and 
the humanities, today often framed as the ‘two cultures’ of science, with ref-
erence to Charles P. Snow (1969).
Kroeber tried to accomplish his boundary work by focussing on a con-
cept of culture that not only saved man from being just another animal but 
provided cultural anthropology with a distinct phenomenon to study. He 
defined culture not only as independent of but also as analogous to biological 
heredity. To make this move, which is a move towards autonomy from bio-
logical perspectives, Kroeber used the biologists’s own concept of heredity 
and stressed that a Weismannian, that is a non-Lamarckian concept of in-
heritance, was necessary to perceive culture as autonomous. In other words, 
Kroeber was crossing boundaries in order to secure them – with conceptual 
bricks from the other side.
At times when disciplines or fields are formed, other disciplines or fields 
– in this case mainly biology – serve as “both matrix and whetting stone”, 
as historian Ross (2003: 211) has claimed, with reference to the social sci-
ences in general. The present article can thus be taken as a case study on the 
dialectics between concepts, in this case heredity and culture. How are they 
traded between disciplines and how are contrasts between concepts used to 
arrive at an epistemic object that can be appropriated? To isolate such a field-
defining subject matter is, I argue, important in order to mark off and defend 
a certain territory within the academic division of labour.1 Within this con-
text, this article has two specific aims: firstly, to illuminate the development 
and role of the concepts of heredity and culture within Kroeber’s cultural 
determinism (i.e. the claim that culture explains culture) and how this de-
marcation differs from earlier landmarks in the development of the concept 
of culture; secondly, to address the impact of the concept of Weismannian 
heredity, what we now call ‘hard inheritance’, on the development of heredi-
tary thought. The question is: did the spread of a Weismannian concept of 
hard inheritance, with its denial of Lamarckian ‘soft inheritance’, encourage 
hereditarian ideas or not?
The material I use is not new, but the interpretation and the conclusions 
I draw from it are novel. Historians and anthropologists, such as Stocking 
(1968: 258–269), Harris (1968: 121), Peel (1971: 143–146), Cravens (1978: 
105–120), Freeman (1983: 34–50), or Degler (1991: 96–100), have addressed 
Kroeber’s writings on the Lamarckian inheritance of acquired characteris-
tics. Yet they did not see the full significance of Kroeber’s work in under-
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standing the development and role of the concept of culture in our expla-
nations of human existence. In addition, when anthropologists provide an 
account of Kroeber’s cultural determinism, they still ignore the importance 
of Kroeber’s use of Weismannian ideas (e.g. Patterson 2001). Although my 
aim is not to justify Kroeber’s point of view, I shall nonetheless claim that 
we can make historical sense of it only if we acknowledge its Weismannian 
underpinning. Furthermore, while the contemporary anthropologist Ingold 
(2001) criticizes Kroeber for relying on a physical-cultural divide within an-
thropology and thus for splitting human beings into different compartments, 
this paper takes a step back. It seeks to explain what Kroeber did, why he did 
it, and what we can learn from his case when writing the history of the con-
cept of culture. This is the first goal of the paper. The second is, as mentioned, 
to illustrate what we can learn from Kroeber’s case when writing accounts 
of the historical impact of the concept of hard inheritance. So far, Kroeber 
has not featured prominently in such accounts (see e.g. Paul 1995: 40–49) 
or in historical accounts of the history of hereditarian ideas in general (e.g. 
Ludmerer 1972).2
In the first part I will discuss the shifting boundaries of anthropology 
at the beginning of the twentieth century. This part illustrates why Kroeber 
needed something with which to oppose to hereditarian thinking. In the sec-
ond part I will analyse how Kroeber used a Weismannian or non-Lamarckian 
concept of heredity to secure the boundaries of cultural anthropology, which 
shows why he wanted geneticists to enter into a coalition with him in order 
to oppose hereditarianism. I will end, in the third part, with conclusions on 
the concept of culture as explanans or explanandum and on why Kroeber’s 
case is important when writing a cultural history of heredity.
The Shifting Boundaries of Anthropology at the Beginning  
of the Twentieth Century
As sciences are organised into disciplines, or sub-disciplines, conceptual 
boundaries are constantly being drawn and redrawn. The space of ideas is 
delineated into areas of autonomy and exclusive authority over problems. 
During the Enlightenment, anthropology had conventionally been defined as 
‘the science of man’. At the beginning of the twentieth century, anthropolo-
gy in America was thought to consist of four parts: archaeology, linguistics, 
physical anthropology, and cultural anthropology (also called ethnology). At 
the same time, anthropology stopped being a mere museum-based activi-
ty and became an academic discipline, with the usual incumbent outward 
signs: curricula, degrees, journals, associations, and the like.3 There was a 
need to define the boundaries of anthropology in relation to other acade-
mic disciplines and areas of research such as psychology, biology in general, 
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and genetics in particular. And there was also a need to define the internal 
relationship between physical and cultural anthropology, since these two 
fields had different affinities. The first tended towards the natural sciences, 
the second towards the humanities and the emerging social sciences, both 
methodologically and conceptually. This tension, created by what was later 
termed the ‘two cultures’ of science, is felt and debated in so-called ‘four-
field anthropology’ in America still today. In the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, when anthropology took shape as part of the general rise of the 
social sciences, anthropology was still dominated by a unified outlook, ai-
ming to knit physical and cultural perspectives together in order to arrive at 
a general ‘science of man’. In the twentieth century the two drifted apart. We 
can illustrate the change by looking at Franz Boas and his student Alfred L. 
Kroeber.4
Franz Boas (1858–1942), founding figure of academic anthropology in 
the US, was educated as a scientist. He made important contributions to 
physical anthropology and regarded this field as central in understanding 
the cultural differences within and between groups of people. Heredity, a 
phenomenon considered part of physical anthropology, was for him one of 
several factors an anthropologist had to take into account to understand the 
development and behaviour of individuals and the differences discernable 
between them. In Changes in the Bodily Form of Descendants of Immigrants 
(1912), his famous study on the formative influence of environmental fac-
tors, he built his arguments for the plasticity of bodily characteristics on 
anthropometric evidence.5 In 1904, reviewing the history of anthropology, 
he described the state of the art of anthropology in the following manner:
At the present time anthropologists occupy themselves with problems relating to the physi-
cal and mental life of mankind as found in varying forms of society, from the earliest times 
up to the present period, and in all parts of the world. Their researches bear upon the form 
and functions of the body as well as upon all kinds of manifestations of mental life. Accord-
ingly, the subject matter of anthropology is partly a branch of biology, partly a branch of the 
mental sciences. Among the mental phenomena language, invention, art, religion, social 
organisation and law have received particular attention. (Boas 1904: 513)
But he also noted: “Among anthropologists of our time we find a considera-
ble amount of specialization of the subject matter of their researches accor-
ding to the divisions here given.” (ibid.: 513–4) Today, 100 years later, Segal 
and Yanagisako (2005: 29) state that after Boas “no one has actually worked 
creatively in more than two of the four fields”.
The ‘first Boasian’, his student Alfred L. Kroeber (1876–1960), was al-
ready more specialised and tried to distance himself from one of the four 
fields, namely the field of physical anthropology. Kroeber never contributed 
anything important to physical anthropology and focused on the historical 
development of cultures. “The other parts were secondary and marginal and 
owed their significance to their contribution towards an understanding of 
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culture history”, as the anthropologist David Bidney (1965: 268) writes. In 
part this was certainly due to the success of Boas in giving culture history 
a secure foundation on which his students could build. It was certainly also 
the “personal inclination of the investigator”, a factor Boas (1904: 514) men-
tioned himself with respect to the ongoing specialisation within four-field 
anthropology.
Kroeber had his personal inclinations, not always in harmony with his 
teacher.6 Born in 1876, in Hoboken, New Jersey, he grew up in a German-
Jewish intellectual environment in New York and received Columbia’s first 
PhD in anthropology in 1901, the ninth in the whole US, supervised by Boas. 
He did not have a background in a natural science and wrote his doctoral 
dissertation on the decorative symbolism of the Arapaho (Kroeber 1901). 
On the basis of careful fieldwork according to Boas’s strict methodological 
standards, Kroeber showed that the Arapaho did not themselves operate ac-
cording to the anthropologist’s binary opposition between decorative and 
realistic art.7 On completing his PhD he was immediately given a permanent 
position. His job was to build up a department of anthropology at the Uni-
versity of California, Berkeley. By 1907 he was an important figure in the 
discipline and is seen even today as the most influential figure after Boas in 
the establishment of cultural anthropology in the US. He made important 
contributions to American anthropology, especially with respect to the lan-
guages, kinship systems, and cultures of the Native Americans of California 
(Kroeber 1917b, Kroeber/Dixon 1919, Kroeber 1925, 1939). With his Hand-
book of the Indians of California (1925) he became the leading figure in North 
American ethnography. His The Natural and Cultural Areas in Native North 
America (1939) carved out the major ‘culture areas’ – as opposed to natural, 
geographic areas – and introduced the concept of ‘culture climax’, which was 
thought to replace the concept of culture centres, then common in diffusion 
studies.8 He also contributed important work to linguistics and archaeology.9 
His Anthropology (1923) was the first general textbook on anthropology and 
was widely used, assessing the state of the new academic discipline whose 
establishment was one of his major concerns. As the quotation from Kroeber 
in the opening of this article shows, he was concerned whether there was 
enough room for what he calls the ‘superorganic’ and for those that wanted 
to study it professionally.10
Even though the disciplinary and institutional history of cultural anthro-
pology is not a focus of this study, the following episode from the politics 
of science illustrates that cultural anthropologists like Kroeber had genuine 
reasons to be afraid they might be forced to become biologists. There was a 
practical pressure to secure the boundaries of anthropology in the spirit of 
the Boasians.
Between 1916 and 1918, Boas and his students fought for acceptance in 
the US scientific bureaucracy. At issue were the posts on the National Re-
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search Council’s Committee on Anthropology. For historians of anthropol-
ogy the story is well known. George E. Hale, the Director of the National 
Research Council, asked William H. Holmes (1846–1933), an important 
figure in pre-Boasian American anthropology and defender of a racial in-
terpretation of cultural differences, to organise the Committee on Anthro-
pology. Holmes chose Aleš Hrdlička (1869–1943) to take the lead. Hrdlička 
defended physical anthropology as an independent discipline. One of their 
goals was to prevent Boas and his students gaining control over the commit-
tee, thus preventing cultural anthropology from becoming too influential. 
Both Holmes and Hrdlička regarded cultural anthropology as unscientific, 
as not being a ‘hard’ science, as Cravens (1978: 110–115) reports. Yet they 
could not totally ignore Boas. Holmes thus put Hrdlička, Boas, and Charles 
B. Davenport (1866–1944) – geneticist and leader of the American eugeni-
cist movement – on the list for the committee. Finally, Hale dropped Boas 
from the committee because of Boas’s anti-war activism. In April 1917, Mad-
ison Grant (1865–1938), a wealthy advocate of racism, who published his 
best-selling book The Passing of the Great Race in 1916, offered money for 
the committee’s work in exchange of membership. The committee consisted 
then of Holmes, Hrdlička, Grant, and Davenport. In the end it was Daven-
port who was selected by Hale in February 1918 to represent the interests of 
the Committee on Anthropology to the National Research Council’s Division 
of Medicine and Related Sciences. Thus, a geneticist who defended racist 
and eugenic doctrines came to represent anthropology within the scientific 
bureaucracy of the National Research Council – at a time when there were 
already academics educated as anthropologists and capable of the job.11
As the involvement of Holmes already indicates, the struggle of cultural 
anthropology for acceptance and autonomy from genetics and physical an-
thropology coincided with the struggle for emancipation from the older gen-
eration of anthropologists such as Holmes, who were not trained as anthro-
pologists and were predominantly oriented towards a racial hereditarianism. 
Last but not least, it was linked to the general dominance of racism and 
eugenics in the US at that time. There were thus three important contexts 
of cultural anthropology’s formative years in the US: the institutional de-
marcation from genetics and physical anthropology, the emancipation from 
the older generation, and the dominance of racial hereditarianism. I cannot 
go deeper into these contexts here; important in this study on the dialectic 
relationship between the concepts of heredity and culture in Kroeber’s work 
is simply that these are three main contexts in which Kroeber worked as a 
young academic.
That Kroeber perceived a danger (and wanted others to perceive such a 
danger) is also evident from the language of war and territory that he used. 
According to him, biology was a discipline that “forged its weapons, taught 
itself their use, conquered a territory, and stands forth a young giant of prow-
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ess” in order to “annex the antiquated realm of history that lay adjacent” 
(Kroeber 1916a: 34).
Yet, in an astonishing twist, Kroeber used the biologists’s own concept 
of hard inheritance in order to reinforce cultural anthropology’s opposi-
tion both to the institutional hegemony of biologists and to the scientific 
hegemony of hereditarianism. According to the historian Stocking, Kroeber 
was the only one among the social scientists who realised that the concept 
of Lamarckian inheritance (i.e. inheritance of acquired characteristics) hin-
dered the autonomy of anthropology and other social sciences (Stocking 
1968: 259).
Culture and/as Inheritance in Kroeber’s Work
Kroeber’s boundary work for anthropology found its first peak with a couple 
of papers between 1915 and 1917, ending with his famous article The Superor-
ganic (1917a), which established cultural determinism as his major doctrine.
Kroeber had already laid down the basic outline of his approach to cul-
ture, heredity, and anthropology in 1910. His example was morality: accord-
ing to him, morality is governed by an innate, instinctual moral sense. Yet 
variations in moral behaviour between “civilized people” and “uncivilized 
people” are due to varying cultural influences and not due to innate differ-
ences in the alleged moral sense. In other words, behavioural differences do 
not imply that there are essential inborn differences between groups of peo-
ple. On the contrary, we should assume an anti-racist concept of a shared 
human nature.12 “As an integral constituent of man,” Kroeber wrote, the 
moral sense “is common to all races in identical or virtually identical form. 
Variations in moral ideas are reflections of changes in civilization.” (Kroe-
ber 1910: 446) Differences between groups of people in conduct, rules, and 
ideas should thus be explained by the influence of what Kroeber called inter-
changeably ‘civilization’, ‘history’, or ‘culture’. 13 Yet, according to Kroeber, this 
does not exclude individual innate differences to do with the innate moral 
sense. Shared human nature is an “identity of average” as he makes most 
clear in Kroeber (1917a: 194–203).
From these assumptions, Kroeber went on to describe culture as “out-
side of race and independent of the human body” (Kroeber 1910: 446). He 
uses this claim to explicate his anti-racist conception of the moral sense. As 
culture
affects only the body of knowledge possessed by a people and the actions connected with 
this knowledge, the principles of morality cannot be influenced by civilization, however the 
concrete expression of these principles may vary in their adaptation to particular forms of 
civilization. The apparent difference between the morality of savages and ourselves is there-
fore not really in the morality but in the civilization. (Ibid.: 446)
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Culture has its own body, a “body of knowledge”, and does not influence the 
biological body. Two aspects, whose connections will get clearer as we move 
through Kroeber’s early theoretical work, are important for this study. First-
ly, implicitly excluding Lamarckian inheritance of acquired characteristics, 
Kroeber argued that human nature is not only universal but also hard and 
permanent, “incapable of racial improvement” (ibid.). Secondly, he suggested 
that human culture is independent of race and the human body. Culture is a 
system or process sui generis. This is similar to Durkheim’s (1893, 1895) idea 
of social facts.14 In Kroeber’s case, it means that culture determines – that 
is, influences – culture (via behaviour), but it does not influence the physical 
body, at least not the innate racial basis of the respective behaviour, and vice 
versa. When Kroeber (1916b, 1917a) suggests that culture is “superorganic”, 
he means that culture influences and thus explains culture. Superorganic 
culture comes on top of organic factors and is based on “social inheritance 
or cultural transmission” instead of biological inheritance (Kroeber 1916c: 
368).15
To understand Kroeber’s position clearly, the following issues have to be 
addressed. Firstly, what is the epistemological status of this claim? In his 1915 
paper Eighteen Professions, arguing for the autonomy of anthropology as a 
distinct discipline, Kroeber asserted that the notion of the unity of human-
kind based on inborn mental characteristics is not a proved or disproved 
fact, but a necessary assumption for the “historian”, by which he means 
the anthropologist, since otherwise “his work becomes a vitiated mixture 
of history and biology” (Kroeber 1915: 285). The necessary assumption can 
also be interpreted as a definition of the subject matter, a definition Jackson 
(forthcoming) judges as “pragmatic”. Even though the goal of this paper is 
not to make a philosophical justification of Kroeber’s cultural determinism, 
it seems appropriate to make the following observation. Kroeber’s cultural 
determinism (culture explains culture) could be taken as a tautological defi-
nition: everything which is cultural is cultural. If at all, then this tautological 
character of the definition holds for any analytical definition (e.g. for the 
definition of a ‘bachelor’ as an unmarried man). As a definition it is vacuous. 
But it is nonetheless fruitful, since it helped Kroeber to delineate the subject 
matter of his discipline. Furthermore, Kroeber’s definition does not exclude 
the interaction of history and biology. On the contrary, it includes it and does 
so without contradicting the definition. Kroeber acknowledges that history 
and biology are intertwined and claims that the degree of their contribution 
to the development of individuals cannot be tested (Kroeber 1915: 285). The 
claim that the behaviour of individuals and their development is caused by 
multiple factors, culture being merely one of them, is however compatible 
with the argument that culture is a process in its own right. It is only if we 
look (in the epistemic sense) at culture itself, that we see that culture is inde-
pendent of nature, a phenomenon that can only be explained by reference to 
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pre-existing culture. It is in this inter-individual, almost phylogenetic sense 
that culture always derives from previous culture, as a cell always derives 
from previous cells.
The second issue that might cause misunderstanding is the issue of ho-
lism. Kroeber’s paper on culture as superorganic is often seen as defend-
ing a strong holistic conception of culture and has been criticised for this 
reason (Bidney 1944, Herskovits 1948). Even though I do not aim to make a 
judgement on this issue here, the following two points should be taken into 
account. Firstly, although Kroeber believed that “[c]ivilization is not mental 
action itself ” but “a body or stream of products of mental exercise” (Kroeber 
1917a: 189, 192), he also believed that culture (i.e. civilization) is maintained 
via individual mental states or individual actions. Furthermore, to claim that 
culture is a “body or stream of products of mental action” is not to point to 
an ontologically dubious whole; it points to a causal inter-individual lineage 
of the effects of mental acts. In addition, although Kroeber sometimes talks 
in his 1917 paper as if individuals are mere passive bearers of culture – im-
plying that their properties do not determine culture and that culture does 
not determine the properties of individuals – and as if culture is a special 
ontological substance, the light that falls on his 1917 paper changes, if we 
look at his overall career. In 1952, Kroeber recanted from a ‘holistic’ anti-
individualistic stance. He admitted that culture as a whole is not an emergent 
entity or substance and that individuals are more important than he had 
maintained in 1917. His goal in 1917, as he himself said in 1952, had been to 
establish the recognition of culture as an autonomous system, independent of 
“biological explanation” (Kroeber 1952: 4, 22–23, Kroeber/Kluckhohn 1952: 
49). My claim is not that he had not been holistic in 1917, or that he cannot 
be interpreted as holistic; my claim is merely that if the context of an opposi-
tion to hereditarianism is ignored, Kroeber’s assertion of the superorganic 
nature of culture (and thus the genesis of his ‘holistic’ tone) cannot properly 
be understood.16 I thus depart from the conclusions drawn by anthropolo-
gists such as Bidney (1965), who deduce that the concept of the superorganic 
(and the cultural determinism built upon it) make no sense due to the lack 
of a total independence of culture from individuals. It did make sense, but 
only in a very specific sense: in the sense of a separate system of change and 
inheritance. Here I use the term ‘system’ or ‘process’ to follow Kroeber with 
his late assertion that he does not regard culture as a “substance” (Kroeber 
1952: 4, 22). With this I do not seek to determine whether the ontological 
status of culture has to be interpreted in a realistic or nominalistic manner: 
whether culture (or beauty, truth etc.) can exist in itself, or whether such 
‘things’ exist solely in actual culture-bearing individuals (culture in mind, 
beauty in beautiful things, and truth in true statements etc.). Either way it 
can be asserted that culture exists as an inter-individual process or system, a 
system of change and heredity. In a similar sense, we can say that evolution is 
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a process or system of change that exists, even though individual organisms 
vanish, without regarding evolution as a special substance, an extra entity 
existing in addition to, and in the same sense as evolving entities. Kroeber’s 
‘holistic’ overtones rested on the idea that culture is an autonomous system 
of change and heredity, at least in the papers under review here, and this 
kernel of his cultural determinism was in turn related to his opposition to 
hereditarianism. Finally, it was this opposition that correlates with the denial 
of the Lamarckian principle of the inheritance of acquired characteristics, to 
which I will turn next and which Kroeber considered as vitally important in 
fighting racism and eugenics.
In 1916, in a paper called Inheritance by Magic, Kroeber moved the de-
nial of inheritance of acquired characteristics to the centre of his work. In 
order to do so, he referred to three important aspects of August Weismann’s 
(1834–1914) ideas on inheritance: firstly, that experiments failed to produce 
positive evidence for the inheritance of acquired characteristics; secondly, 
that all cases of evolution are explainable without reference to the inher-
itance of acquired characteristics; thirdly, that inheritance is ‘hard,’ a term 
neither Weismann nor Kroeber themselves used, but which was introduced 
by Cyril Darlington (1959: 14, 54–56) and is still used today. That hered-
ity is ‘hard’ meant for Weismann (1885, 1892) that the hereditary material 
is not produced anew by the organism but present from the start, existing 
continuously, and protected against changes that occur in the somatic tissue. 
Acquired changes, that is changes to the somatic tissue of the organisms, 
are not heritable on this basis. In Kroeber’s words, Weismann’s “basic idea” 
was “that the hereditary substance is totally distinct from the organic body, 
and that therefore the fate of the individual cannot affect the race” (Kroeber 
1916a: 26). In addition, Weismann’s concept of heredity was that the ‘germ 
plasm’ existed over time independently of individuals. The ‘germ plasm’ is 
thus sub-individual and inter-individual at the same time – almost as super-
organic and independent of individuals as Kroeber assumed culture to be. 
This is the central point that has to be taken into account in understanding 
Kroeber’s concept of culture.
Kroeber also referred to Mendelism, the “new branch of biological sci-
ence”, as providing a corroboration of this concept of hard inheritance. Thus 
he wrote that although Mendelians perceive themselves as opposed to Dar-
winism, “one of their fundamental achievements has been the involuntary 
confirmation by real knowledge of an idea first clearly grasped by a Dar-
winian theorist” (Kroeber 1916a: 27). Kroeber also acknowledged that the 
dismissal of inheritance of acquired characteristics did not rest on empirical 
proof. In some circles, Kroeber noted, it had even become a “taboo” (ibid.: 
28).
In other circles, however, the principle of the inheritance of acquired 
characteristics was still quite popular, despite Weismannism and despite 
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Mendelism. Because of this, Kroeber called his paper Inheritance by Magic, 
asserting that “if found in the minds of uncivilized people”, the belief in the 
inheritance of acquired characteristics “would be described as belief in sym-
pathetic magic” (ibid.: 38). This is anthropology of science: Kroeber used the 
conceptual toolbox of anthropology (magic, taboo, etc.) to ask why people 
still believed (or did not believe) in Lamarckian inheritance.
In this context, Kroeber cited two motivations for belief in the inherit-
ance of acquired characters. Firstly, Lamarckian palaeontologists (as well 
as Mendelians) maintained that Darwinism could not explain the origin of 
variation. Thus, in order to account for the origin of variation, some sci-
entists called the inheritance of acquired characteristics to the rescue. Yet 
Kroeber believed this was not a viable route for Mendelians, since if they 
moved back to Lamarckian inheritance, they would run into acute tension 
with their own views about heredity (ibid.: 30). Secondly, the general pub-
lic and social scientists stuck to inheritance of acquired characteristics for 
another reason: they still did not distinguish between culture and race (syn-
chronic perspective) and between cultural change and biological evolution 
(diachronic perspective) in a “consistent” manner. They confused culture 
with nature (Kroeber 1916a: 31; cf. Kroeber 1916b: 295, 1916c: 370, 1917a: 
163).
According to Kroeber, this confusion was caused by the assumption that 
cultural change is evidence for and is causally linked to biological evolution. 
In Kroeber’s words, it arose from the assumption that “the acquisition of 
greater wealth or learning or skill by one group is evidence of a superior 
faculty for such acquisition inborn in that group through organic heredity” 
(Kroeber 1916a: 33). This is what Kroeber called the “fallacy that the social 
is organic” (ibid.: 36). Those who “nominally” employ culture but regard it 
nonetheless as “ultimately, and in general directly, resolvable into organic 
factors”, are susceptible to this fallacy (ibid.: 37). The influence of Boas is 
evident here, since it was Boas (1911), who stressed that culture, language, 
and race (i.e. the genetic endowment of people) do not co-vary and that we 
cannot simply infer racial differences in natural endowment from differences 
in behaviour, belief, art, and custom, or identify the former with the latter. 
Yet Boas did not relate his insights about the non-correlation of culture, lan-
guage, and race to the issue of Lamarckian inheritance. It was Kroeber who 
claimed that what makes this fallacy possible is the belief in Lamarckian in-
heritance.
And indeed, take for instance Herbert Spencer (1820–1903), at Kroe-
ber’s time still the most influential Lamarckian in the area of mental traits. 
Spencer assumed that civilization was correlated with biological evolution 
and can only be explained by reference to Lamarckian inheritance, where 
‘nurture’ becomes ‘nature’ in each generation, leading to innate differences 
between races. Thus, Spencer (1898) wrote that:
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Certain powers which mankind has gained in the course of civilization cannot, I think, be 
accounted for without admitting the inheritance of acquired modifications. The musical 
faculty is one of these. To say that ‘natural selection’ has developed it by preserving the most 
musically endowed, seems an inadequate explanation. (Spencer 1898: 311)
Neither a “musical career” in nineteenth century England, nor the posses-
sion of the “rudimentary faculty in a somewhat greater degree” in earlier 
stages, “through which the faculty must have passed”, (ibid.: 311) meant any 
advantage in fitness on which natural selection could have acted. Spencer 
concluded:
There is no explanation but that the habitual association of certain cadences of speech with 
certain emotions, has slowly established in the race an organized and inherited connection 
between such cadences and such emotions; that the combination of such cadences, more or 
less idealized, which constitutes melody, has all along had a meaning in the average mind, 
only because of the meaning which cadences had acquired in the average mind; and that 
by the continual hearing and practice of melody there has been gained and transmitted an 
increasing musical sensibility. (Spencer 1898: 311–312)
Spencer’s account of the evolution of mental traits was broadly as follows: 
new behavioural patterns or associations between sense experiences become 
habits, which become instincts (via the inheritance of acquired characteri-
stics); these instincts play a role in the genesis of new behavioural patterns 
or sense experiences, which become habits, which then in turn become in-
stincts, and so on.17 As the quotation indicates, the explanation of the evo-
lution of such mental abilities as intelligence, moral, or musical sense is one 
of the reasons why Spencer opposed Weismann in the well-known debate 
about the all-sufficiency of selection (Spencer 1893a, 1893b, 1894; Weis-
mann 1893, 1895), a debate which arose because Weismann totally excluded 
inheritance of acquired characteristics.
In 1889 and 1892, in a paper on the musical sense of animals and humans, 
Weismann had already stated that a point of view such as Spencer’s ignores 
the fact that tradition, or culture in Kroeber’s sense, makes Lamarckian ex-
planations superfluous.18 Even though natural selection might not be enough 
as an explanation, we still do not need Lamarckian inheritance to explain 
the evolution of man’s capacities and achievements, as long as we admit that 
there is something like tradition and culture. According to Weismann, Spen-
cer confuses achievements (culture or cultural change) with innate abilities 
(nature or biological evolution). He thus ignores the fact that the former 
can change without the latter. Spencer’s assertion of the impossibility of ex-
plaining certain changes in innate abilities in terms of natural selection is 
irrelevant, since these changes in innate abilities exist only in the mind of the 
observer. In other words, Weismann believed that the alleged unexplainable 
increase in musical ability did simply not exist and that there are no justified 
reasons to believe that such an increase has taken place (Weismann 1889 
[1892]: 600–603). Weismann illustrated his point with the following thought 
“if there is NOthiNg beyOND the OrgANic…”
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experiment. Is it possible that there was a Mozart in Samoa, a person with a 
musical sense or innate ability equal to Mozart’s? According to Weismann, 
it would indeed be possible. But since the hypothetical “Samoaner Mozart” 
(ibid.: 601) could not build on already accumulated musical traditions, and 
the corresponding culturally transmitted abilities, it would have been im-
possible for him to express his profound musical sensibility the way the real 
Mozart had. Kroeber acknowledged Weismann’s essay and relied on it, but 
regarded it as “a brilliant miss”, since in the end Weismann “hastened to the 
inconsequent conclusion that faculties are probably different after all” (Kroe-
ber 1916a: 37).
Be it as it may, it follows from Weismann’s and Kroeber’s accounts that 
cultural evolution can proceed independently from biological evolution. 
Kroeber expressed this claim most clearly in the following diagram:
Kroeber presented the diagram in order to stress that the lines, representing 
the three different systems of change (inorganic, organic, and superorganic), 
develop independently from each other. This image served as a foundation 
for his cultural determinism, in which culture or superorganic change (dot-
ted line) is a form of heredity, changing in an analogous but autonomous 
manner – autonomous from biological heredity or organic change (dashed 
line), and autonomous from inorganic physical persistence (continuous line). 
The historically important point for Kroeber is B, which he described as the 
moment at which the first human was able to learn socially from others. C 
stands for ‘primitive’ man, and D for the present moment. Kroeber defined 
“[h]eight above the base” as “degree of advancement, whether that be com-
plexity, heterogeneity, degree of co-ordination, or anything else” (Kroeber 
1917a: 210–211). A page later, he refers to the increase in the number of 
cultural items and the complexity of social organisation as the factors that 
distinguish us from the Neandertal people – taken as an example of the 
primitive man. The terms ‘advancement’ and ‘progress’ occur sporadically 
in the 1917 and other papers. Despite this progressivist wording, Kroeber 
tried to distance himself from progressivism by stressing: “Nothing is more 
erroneous than the wide-spread idea and oft-repeated statement that the 
savage is only a child” (Kroeber 1910: 445), a statement that directly leads to 
Figure 1: The relation-
ship between inorganic, 
organic and superorganic 
change, from Kroeber 
(1917a: 211).
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a critique of Darwin and like-minded thinkers who claimed that the “savage 
is in a stage intermediate between the higher animals and ourselves” (ibid.). 
Kroeber also stressed that “[a]ll men are totally civilized” (Kroeber 1915: 286) 
and that he did not use the term civilization for “high” civilization, since 
for him it made perfectly sense to talk about “Apache civilization” (Kroeber 
1918: 355), which includes their language, kinship systems, habits, religion, 
diet, and the like. In part, this explains why Kroeber could use the terms ‘cul-
ture’ and ‘civilization’ synonymously, as indicated above. Yet, it still gives a 
mixed picture on whether Kroeber was still progressivist, as Spencer clearly 
was, and thus less radical than his teacher Boas, whose cultural relativism 
was meant as revolt against the progressivism of classical evolutionism in 
anthropology. A precise answer is, however, not central to the issues raised 
here. What is central is that Kroeber opposed what I would like to call racist 
hereditarianism.
Let me add a note on eugenics, which Kroeber also opposed (e.g. Kroe-
ber 1916a: 34–37, 1916c: 370, 1917a: 188–189). If eugenics is understood, 
as Kroeber did, in a narrow sense that assumes that progress cannot be 
achieved by social reform or education, then let us call it hereditarian ‘hard’ 
eugenics. Since it denies the possibility of long-term human betterment 
via cultural inheritance, it has to rely on the social selection of individuals, 
that is through increasing or decreasing the rate of reproduction of certain 
individuals. If eugenics is, however, understood to include a Lamarckian 
point of view, then it reduces culture to environmental influences that are 
projected into the next generation via biological inheritance. Cooke (1998) 
suggests that eugenics was Lamarckian before 1915, a kind of ‘soft’ eugen-
ics, and predominantly hereditarian in the narrow sense and thus ‘hard’ 
afterwards. That hard eugenics could not be hurt by Kroeber’s conceptual 
developments should be evident, since it also relied on the concept of hard 
inheritance. I will come back to eugenics in the last part of this study, when 
I address the consequences of Kroeber’s case for the historical impact of the 
concept of hard inheritance.
Racist hereditarianism up to Kroeber’s time, exemplified here by Her-
bert Spencer, regarded the synchronic and diachronic behavioural differ-
ences between groups of people as being correlated with and largely caused 
by innate differences in abilities to produce these cultural differences. Thus, 
greater wealth and power of one group of people can be correlated with and 
regarded as being due to higher innate intelligence. In a diachronic perspec-
tive, every cultural change (civilization) is accompanied by a change in in-
nate endowment. This is what Kroeber denies. Yet by assuming an inborn 
faculty of humans for civilization and by assuming innate individual differ-
ences, Kroeber also subscribed to a hereditarian basis for human existence; 
he merely rejected its racist version.19 Kroeber therefore refers to Galton as 
being right in claiming that
“if there is NOthiNg beyOND the OrgANic…”
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between individuals mental faculties are inherited in the same ratio and degree, and there-
fore presumably in the same manner, as physical traits, which is reasonable as well as con-
vincing. But it is an entirely uncompelling inference when he then proceeds to explain the 
diversity between the attainments of social groups such as ancient Athenians, modern 
Englishmen, Africans, and Australian natives, as due to differences between the average 
inherited faculties of the bodies of men carrying the civilizations of these social groups. 
(Kroeber 1916a: 36)
In 1917, Kroeber added:
That heredity operates in the domain of mind as well as that of the body, is one thing; that 
therefore heredity is the mainspring of civilization, is an entirely different proposition, with-
out any necessary connection, and certainly without any established connection, with the 
former conclusion. (Kroeber 1917a: 192)
In addition, when looking at culture in the manner Kroeber does, cultural 
inheritance – symbolised by the dotted line in the diagram above – emerges 
as the very process that makes culture ‘superorganic’. If culture and biological 
evolution are as decoupled as Kroeber assumes, then culture becomes clear-
ly visible as a separate, second system of inheritance and change. In the end, 
culture is conceived as being independent of biological heredity (culture as 
superorganic) and, at the same time, it is conceived as heredity of another 
sort. A close epistemic coupling, via contrast and analogy, leads to a concep-
tual and causal decoupling of heredity and culture.
Finally, the conceptual separation should, according to Kroeber, be 
linked to a disciplinary one: biologists should limit their studies to bio-
logical heredity and the respective organic mental faculties and leave the 
explanation of the superorganic culture to the anthropologists. Given that 
both had a distinct subject matter to study, Kroeber assumed that “[b]
iology and history can join hands in alliance across the gulf that separates 
them” (Kroeber 1916a: 39). Everybody got his or her share of the cake. To 
return to where we started: if there is something superorganic, anthropol-
ogists do not have to turn into biologists. Instead, biologists were invited 
to “join them in a co-operative effort to establish the exact nature and the 
precise limits of the organic and the superorganic” (Kroeber 1916b: 295). 
In the end Kroeber’s plea for a coalition was fulfilled when, for instance, 
Thomas H. Morgan, Columbia’s famous geneticist, joined in. In 1924, in 
a paper called Human Inheritance, and again in his The Scientific Basis of 
Evolution, Morgan had already presented social evolution and its pecu-
liar process of “social and economic inheritance” (Morgan 1924: 406) as 
an Ersatz for the Lamarckian inheritance of acquired characteristics, for 
which he sees no experimental evidence (Morgan 1932: 187–217). Social 
inheritance can be seen as such an Ersatz precisely because it leads to the 
same effects, that is because it is functionally equivalent: efforts to change 
or to learn during one’s lifetime are heritable and thus not pointless from 
an inter-generational, evolutionary point of view. Consequently, Morgan 
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advocates the same interdisciplinary division of labour between geneti-
cists and anthropologists that Kroeber asked for.
The Various Theoretical Lives of Culture
The concept of culture has many dimensions. What was the general deve-
lopment of the concept of culture before and after Kroeber? How does cul-
ture influence the methods of anthropologists? How can we conceptualise 
cultural change and diffusion, or how does cultural learning – what Kroeber 
called ‘inheritance’ – work? Does anthropology need a concept of culture 
at all? These are just a couple of questions that deserve careful analysis in 
and of themselves, and are still the subject of controversial debates.20 I fo-
cus on an aspect that is important for this study and around which there 
seems to be a consensus in anthropology: that culture is a system of change 
maintained via a distinctive inter-individual, trans-generational process of 
cultural inheritance. In this sense even today culture is conceived as some-
thing sui generis, as autonomous. Above, I described how this aspect of the 
contemporary anthropological concept of culture emerged in the work of 
Kroeber and how he was influenced by the biological concept of heredity 
prevalent at the time.
I will now illustrate the importance of the emergence of this aspect in a 
more systematic way, by distinguishing between three theoretical roles the 
concept of culture played with respect to the contrast between nature and 
culture up to the time of Kroeber’s early work. For this I will use the dis-
tinction between explanandum and explanans, common in the philosophy 
of science and introduced by Hempel and Oppenheim (1948) in order to 
describe the structure of a deductive-nomological explanation. This kind of 
explanation was thought to contain the conclusion, a sentence describing the 
phenomenon to be explained (explanandum), and the premises, sentences 
used to account for the phenomenon (explanans). I apply the two terms in 
a slightly more liberal manner to refer to any kind of conceptual tools used 
to designate what is to be explained (explanandum), and to refer to the ele-
ments referred to in an explanation of a specific phenomenon (explanans).
Within the areas of anthropology up to the 1920s that dealt with explana-
tions of behavioural or mental differences between groups of people, three 
major theoretical roles of the concept of culture can be distinguished:
(C 1) Culture has been understood as behavioural and symbolic patterns 
distinctive of a society. It has thus to be understood as an explanandum, some-
thing that is to be explained, by innate endowment, physical environment, so-
cial structure, history, habits, or all of them together. I regard Edward B. Tylor’s 
classic anthropological definition of culture as an exemplar of this category:
“if there is NOthiNg beyOND the OrgANic…”
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Culture or Civilization, taken in its wide ethnographic sense, is that complex whole which 
includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and other capabilities and habits ac-
quired by man as a member of a society. (Tylor 1871: 1)
This definition does not imply that culture is explained by cultural inheri-
tance in the sense Kroeber means it. The phrase “acquired […] as a member 
of society” is ambiguous; it can mean ‘acquired via social learning’ but it 
does not have to. The term ‘acquired’ in Tylor’s definition seems to play no 
systematic role in his account and the phrase “acquired by man as a member 
of society” can also be understood to refer simply to the fact that culture re-
lates to a society of which the individual is a member, regardless of how the 
respective cultural traits are acquired.
(C 2) As Stocking (1968: 195–233) stressed, Franz Boas radicalised Ty-
lor’s classical definition by destroying the progressivism underpinning Tylor’s 
evolutionist account of primitive culture, thereby establishing a truly relativ-
ist concept of culture and initiating a consequential decoupling of nature 
from culture. In addition to his relativist concept of culture, Franz Boas is 
well known for his critique of racism, irrespective of whether it was applied 
to physical or other characteristics of peoples. He regarded culture as an 
important factor in the generation of physical, behavioural, as well as mental 
traits of individuals. In his masterpiece The Mind of Primitive Man (1911), 
he developed many arguments why we have to take culture into account if 
we want to explain body, mind, or civilization. Yet Boas mainly talked about 
culture as a special kind of environment, a social environment that influ-
ences individual development, and he does so not only in the chapter that 
summarises the influence of environment on bodily form, but also in the 
chapter “The Mental Traits of Primitive Man and of Civilized Man”, in which 
he discusses whether we have scientific evidence that observable differences 
in civilization are due to differences in biological endowment. His conclu-
sions are negative: “I do not believe that we are able at the present time to 
form a just valuation of the hereditary mental powers of the different races.” 
(Boas 1911: 122) The terms he applies to frame his arguments in this chap-
ter are: “social surroundings” (ibid.: 100), “social conditions of races” (ibid.: 
101), “environmental causes” as opposed to “hereditary causes” (ibid.: 103), 
and “social causes” (ibid.: 116). In formal terms, he mainly uses culture as 
an explanans: it has to be distinguished clearly from other factors, such as 
hereditary factors, and, together with other factors, it helps to explain body, 
mind, and civilization, the historical change in culture. For Boas, culture in 
Tylor’s sense does not co-vary with physical and linguistic characteristics, 
and to make this argument he had to conceive cultures as somehow coher-
ent systems of belief and conduct. Yet culture as a new kind of heredity, as a 
superorganic system of change and inheritance that defines the boundaries 
between animals and humans and provides a new and special subject matter 
for cultural anthropology, is not, as in Kroeber’s work, a central concept in 
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Boas’ masterpiece. On the contrary, when, for instance, Boas discusses the 
animal-human boundary, he refers to reason, to fewer instincts in humans 
compared to animals, and to individual learning rather than cultural inherit-
ance (Boas 1911: 96–97).
(C 3) It was Kroeber who took a further theoretical step. He explicitly 
regarded culture as a system of change and inheritance in its own right, one 
that relies on social heritage. Culture thus became again an explanandum, 
but a new one. Although the early Kroeber thought that culture is also the 
only explanans for culture as explanandum (only culture explains culture), 
the late Kroeber admitted that many factors are involved in bringing about 
the inter-individual system of change and inheritance he called culture. That 
Kroeber wanted to distinguish his concept of culture from that of Boas is also 
evident from Kroeber/Kluckhohn (1952), a review of various definitions and 
concepts of culture for which the two authors later became famous. They 
place Boas together with Tylor into the category of “descriptive” definitions 
that use enumerations, and Kroeber into this one and into a second category 
of “historical” definitions: definitions with “emphasis on social heritage”. My 
assertion is that the classification offered in 1952, is not revisionary with 
respect to Tylor’s, Boas’s, and Kroeber’s concepts of culture; it matches the 
original intentions of the early papers under discussion here.
To prevent misunderstanding of the distinctiveness of the three theoreti-
cal roles the concept of culture plays in Tylor, Boas, and Kroeber, I have to 
add some clarifications. Certainly, all three authors knew that humans do not 
only transmit genes but learn from each other, and they all used culture in all 
three senses discussed above. Yet the question is not whether or not there are 
places where one of these authors refers to social learning, or whether they 
use the term ‘culture’ as an explanans or explanandum in the first Tylorian 
sense; the question is, which meaning and role was central to their approach. 
At issue is whether social learning was systematically important to show, for 
instance, that there are, or are not, racial differences in mental capacities, be 
they moral, musical, or any other kind of difference.
For Tylor, cultural inheritance could not be systematically important in 
the same sense it was for Kroeber, because Tylor was too deeply embedded in 
the Lamarckian era of heredity. For Boas it simply was not systematically im-
portant; and why should it be? He had other, quite effective weapons at hand 
to fight racism, namely the methodological weapons of physical anthropology 
itself. Just as Kroeber used the biologists’ concept of heredity, Boas used their 
methods to separate heredity and culture. I do not claim that one of these 
developments was historically more important. I only claim that Kroeber, by 
focussing on the concepts of culture and heredity, took a decisive step further 
with respect to the historical development of the concept of culture.
It is this step that is not taken seriously enough, neither by Stocking, who 
is well known for his work on the history of anthropology (especially on Boas, 
“if there is NOthiNg beyOND the OrgANic…”
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Kroeber, Lamarckism in social science, and the concept of culture), nor by 
Cravens and Degler, who have written on the history of hereditarian thought. 
Although Stocking, for instance, acknowledges that Boas still had an “am-
biguous position on the inheritance of acquired characteristics” (Stocking 
1968: 265) and realises that Kroeber radicalised Boas’s approach on culture, 
he still looks at the concept of culture through a Boasian lens. He writes that 
Boas’s and Kroeber’s concept of culture provided “a functionally equivalent 
substitute for the older idea of ‘race temperament’. It explained all the same 
phenomena, but it did so in strictly non-biological terms, and indeed its full 
efficacy as an explanatory concept depended on the rejection of the inherit-
ance of acquired characters” (ibid.: 265). This is misleading. Boas and Kroe-
ber, first of all, did not have the same concept of culture, since in Kroeber’s 
hands culture became a superorganic system of change and inheritance in 
its own right, while Boas was rather sceptical about the concept of culture as 
superorganic, defending a more individualistic standpoint.21 Secondly, Kroe-
ber’s concept did not simply explain the same phenomena, since the concept 
of culture changed its theoretical role from explanans to explanandum. It is 
because Stocking does not distinguish between (C3) and (C2) that he tends 
to identify “cultural determinism” with “cultural determination of behavior” 
(Stocking 1968: 212–220). This confuses the more radical concept, ‘culture 
explains culture’ (cultural determinism) with ‘culture explains behaviour’.22 
Cravens (1978) and Degler (1991) also use the term ‘culture’ to denote an 
environmental factor in the development of individuals. Degler comes close 
to my point of view, when he writes that Kroeber demanded “more than a 
mere change in assumptions as Boas had done; he was insisting upon a new 
mode of explanation for human behavior” (Degler 1991: 94). Freeman (1983) 
probably is closest to my point of view, but he does not distinguish between 
different theoretical roles of the culture concept.
If we turn away from history and look at the conceptual contrast be-
tween nature and culture in contemporary scientific domains, we can easily 
discern the remains of the difference between Boas and Kroeber. The role 
that dominated Boas’s account is what today enters nature/nurture debates 
in psychology and behavioural genetics. And the theoretical role Kroeber 
predominantly assigned to culture is the one used in debates about human-
ity’s place in nature and in those about the interaction between biological 
evolution and cultural change. In other words, the first is used in develop-
mental contexts, the second in evolutionary contexts. Both contexts involve 
different questions of interaction between culture and nature. The historical 
importance of Kroeber’s innovation for these areas can be seen in the con-
temporary prevalence of multiple-inheritance theorists.23 For them culture is 
not only a distinctive factor in the explanation of behaviour, an explanans; it 
is also (and for them most importantly so) a special explanandum, namely a 
separate second system of inheritance of ideational units that can and needs 
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to be studied in its own right. This is exactly what Kroeber wanted to say, 
with the help of Weismann’s concept of hard inheritance.
(C 4) If we look at contemporary multiple inheritance models, we detect 
a further theoretical role of the concept of culture that has to be mentioned 
to complete the picture. Kroeber almost entirely ignored the fact that culture 
can interact with the biological system of inheritance at a phylogenetic level, 
thus influencing natural selection and the distribution of genes in subse-
quent generations in a totally non-Lamarckian manner, without any inherit-
ance of acquired characteristics. Contemporary multiple inheritance models 
that treat niche construction seriously take this further step – dialectically 
with and against Kroeber. They can be taken as representatives of a fourth 
theoretical role of the concept of culture. For multiple inheritance models, 
culture is a factor, an explanans, not only in the ontogenetic development of 
individuals but a factor in the phylogenetic process of (culture and nature in-
teracting in) the biological evolution of organisms (that have a body, a mind, 
and a culture). Niche construction and niche inheritance use culture exactly 
in that fourth sense. Unanalysed here but important nonetheless is that, at 
the beginning of the twentieth century, the concept of counter-selection, 
used by some eugenicists, and the concept of the Baldwin effect, defended 
by James M. Baldwin and others, exemplify a similar non-Lamarckian use of 
culture as a phylogenetic factor in the evolution of organisms.24
To summarise, my first general conclusion is: the concept of culture can 
have four theoretical roles or ‘lives’ in explaining human existence. Kroeber 
initiated one of them, namely that culture is an explanandum that has to be 
distinguished clearly from heredity, the latter being an important explanan-
dum in biology in general, and the paradigmatic explanandum of genetics, 
which also had to stabilise itself as a scientific discipline during Kroeber’s 
time, and whose representatives Kroeber hoped would participate in a fruit-
ful division of academic labour, so that they each had a room of their own in 
the newly-renovated house of twentieth-century science.
The Historical Impact of the Concept of Hard Inheritance
By way of conclusion I discuss the second general topic of this essay. What 
was the historical impact of Weismann’s concept of hard inheritance on how 
the relationship between nature and culture was conceived? I want to defend 
the following three theses, and I claim originality only for the last one.
(H 1) Inheritance of acquired characteristics (or soft inheritance) allowed 
for what I call ‘soft hereditarianism’. According to soft inheritance, one could 
be a hereditarian and still give culture a significant role in the evolutionary 
process, since the hereditary material itself was considered as being soft, 
that is, malleable by cultural or environmental influences. If we take Cooke’s 
“if there is NOthiNg beyOND the OrgANic…”
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(1998) claim into account, that there was a Lamarckian ‘soft’ eugenics before 
1915 and a ‘hard’ one afterwards, then it becomes evident that the concept 
of hard inheritance had no impact on eugenics as an ideology with a specific 
social goal in mind. It only had an impact on what means were perceived as 
effective to reach that goal. I take the received view on the history of eugen-
ics as confirming this point. Again, soft heredity allowed for soft eugenics, 
incorporating the idea that education and social reforms can influence the 
innate endowments of the ‘human stock’ directly, thus achieving eugenics’ 
goal, at least in the long run, without preventing certain individuals from 
propagation (via sterilisation, or, in the extreme, via eliminating them). Under 
Lamarckism, you do not select for or against individuals, you change them. 
Most important here: in Lamarckism, culture, and that includes education 
and social reform, could play a role in evolutionary as well as developmental 
explanations without the need to refer to social or cultural inheritance.
(H 2) Given Weismann’s concept of hard inheritance, this possibility was 
gone. As long as cultural inheritance is ignored, hard inheritance leads to 
hard hereditarianism (and hard eugenics), a picture where cultural and en-
vironmental influences cannot exert any immediate influence on the evolu-
tionary process by directly changing the hereditary material. The ways that 
are still open for culture to influence the evolutionary process are indirect 
ones: you need to change the distribution of types of individuals, either by 
selecting individuals (as in eugenic or racist programmes), or by giving na-
ture time to ‘follow up’ (as hypothesized in the Baldwin effect), or by chang-
ing the environment (as conceptualised in niche construction theories). The 
indirect ways of influence that are left for cultural and environmental factors, 
given the concept of hard inheritance, are in principle not necessarily less 
far-reaching than the potential Lamarckian direct strata. Yet, the role of cul-
ture is considerably diminished if Lamarckian soft inheritance is impossible, 
since a whole and potentially powerful type of influence is lost, namely the 
role of directly changing the material of biological heredity.
Most important for this study is, however, that developmental as well 
as evolutionary explanations of organismic traits (be they physical or be-
havioural) could only be reduced to biological inheritance and selection by 
combining the continuity of the germ plasm with the view that the germ 
plasm is the sole hereditary material transferred down the generations of 
individuals. It is the latter notion that we cannot attribute to Weismann, as I 
have shown above.
Both H1 and H2 are more or less part of the received view on the impact 
of soft and hard inheritance on hereditarianism. Yet this consensus also takes 
it for granted that the concept of hard inheritance was partly responsible for 
the vogue of ‘hard hereditarianism’ – a view where nurture (natural environ-
ment and culture) does not play any direct explanatory role in evolutionary 
and developmental contexts. This view is closely connected with the ‘hard 
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eugenics’ mentioned earlier, a eugenics that happily took hard inheritance 
on board, especially for the concept of degeneration: to stress that education 
and social reform are not only useless, but negative in that it prevents the 
upward march of natural selection.25
And indeed, at least until the end of World War I, geneticists as well as 
the general public predominantly believed in the explanatory power of bio-
logical inheritance to explain behavioural differences (within and between 
groups). At least they usually did not say anything to the contrary. Wilhelm 
Johannsen is often cited as an early exception to the rule that ‘geneticists 
were hereditarians’, and Thomas H. Morgan and Herbert S. Jennings are seen 
as exceptions in the 1920s (see Paul 1995: 115–117). The concept of hard 
inheritance surely was not the only reason for the dominance of hereditari-
anism in the first two decades in the US, but it is usually taken as one of the 
reasons, next to the agricultural and experimental success of genetics, socio-
political biases, institutional and power relations, immigration, and the con-
cept of degeneration.26 This is why Bowler (2003: 24), for instance, writes 
that the “social consequences of biological determinism” are not a product of 
social Darwinism or Darwinism as such, but a product of the rise of genetics, 
which “represents the collapse of a pre-Darwinian ‘developmental’ view of 
nature with consequences that were at least as profound as those associated 
with the initial conversion to evolutionism.” The concept of hard inheritance 
was a first instantiation of this breakdown and has thus been held in part 
responsible for it and for biological determinism.
(H 3) I depart from this received view by the following claim: since noth-
ing in the concept of hard inheritance prevented the acknowledgement of 
cultural inheritance, the connection between the concept of hard inheritance 
and biological determinism (or hard hereditarianism) is neither necessary 
nor historically universal, as the examples of Weismann and Kroeber show.
The concept of hard inheritance was not exclusively linked to hereditari-
anism. Or, in other words, the concept of hard inheritance did not have an 
unambiguous unidirectional historical influence. On the contrary, it had an 
important historical impact on the rise of culture as a superorganic, separate 
system of change and inheritance. This concept of culture not only helped 
break the hereditarian consensus of the early twentieth century US, but also 
secured the boundaries of cultural anthropology. It did so by dialectically 
crossing the boundaries of biology. In the end, a new explanandum, a new 
epistemic object was established: culture, defined in sharp contrast to nature.
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Endnotes
1 By the term ‘epistemic object’ I mean any object that can be subject of epistemic (not ne-
cessarily scientific) description. The concept is wider than the concept of ‘epistemic things’, 
established by Rheinberger (1997). The term ‘epistemic object’ is, like the term ‘object’ itself, 
more epistemological than ontological, at least compared to the term ‘thing’. An epistemic 
object does not necessarily have to be part of experimental systems, and a specific concrete 
materiality is not required, yet it can travel or be traded between different systems of refe-
rence, e.g. different disciplines or fields of study, and acquire a new constitutive function 
within these.
2 He is briefly mentioned by Kevles 1985: 332.
3 See Darnell 1971, 1998, Hinsley 1981, Patterson 2001 for detailed accounts of the history of 
anthropology before it became a scientific discipline and how it developed since then.
4 Much more could certainly be said about the tension between cultural and physical anthro-
pology and its further development, but this has to wait for another occasion. See Stocking 
1988 and Segal/Yanagisako 2005 for an overview of the contested history of the four-field 
approach.
5 For more on Boas’s famous study, its context and historical importance consult Stocking 
1968: 161–194, Allen 1989, and Kaufmann 2003.
6 See Jacknis 2002 on some of the tensions.
7 See Jackson forthcoming for more on his dissertation in the context of the subject matter of 
this study.
8 See Bidney 1965: 269 and Buckley 1989.
9 See Bidney 1965 for a short but very informative overview.
10 Much more could be said on his life and oeuvre, which contains more than 500 items. See 
Bidney 1965 for a short review of his work, Steward 1973 for a book-length one, containing 
a summary of the biography written by Kroeber’s wife Theodora Kroeber (1970); see also 
Thoresen 1975 on the establishment, financing, and development of academic anthropolo-
gy in California; see Buckley 1996 on Kroeber’s Californian Ethnology.
11 For more on the “scientific reaction against cultural anthropology”, the context of the epi-
sode and the further history of the Committee on Anthropology, see in particular: Stocking 
1968: 270–308, Cravens 1978: 89–120, Patterson 2001: 55–60.
12 For the history of universalistic concepts of human nature within the history of ethnological 
theory, often used in the version of a ‘psychic unity of mankind’, see Lowie 1937.
13 Although he used the terms interchangeable, Kroeber preferred the term ‘civilization’ 
between 1916–1918, in contrast to later papers. As historian Stocking (1968: 267) put it, 
“Kroeber’s sensitivity to its Germanic associations in time of war prevented him from using 
the term ‘culture’”.
14 Gissis (2002) provides an analysis, complementary to this one on Kroeber, on how Durk-
heim built his ideas on Lamarckian principles.
15 The term ‘superorganic’ stems from Spencer’s Principles of Sociology (1876).
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16 A point I originally took from Kuklick 2004. Kaplan (1965) shows that the actual issue is 
methodological and epistemological and not ontological: it is an issue about the distinctive 
subject matter of anthropology, which also goes in the direction of this argument.
17 See Richards 1987 and Gissis 2005 for more on Spencer.
18 In the 1892 edition of his paper used here, Weismann pointed to an earlier German edition 
of Spencer’s Principles of Biology (1876), above quoted in the English revised edition of 
1898.
19 For further clarification regarding the innatism in Kroeber’s general account of human 
existence see Shapiro 2008.
20 See Ingold 1994, Kuper 1999, 2002, or Fox/King 2002, for some of the historical and current 
issues about the culture concept.
21 See for instance Boas 1932: 245–46. Already in 1904 he criticized social psychology (or folk-
psychology) for their anti-individualistic leaning (Boas 1904: 520).
22 Kronfeldner 2008 and Jackson forthcoming show that the distinction not only helps to sort 
out these historical differences, but also some of the confusions and problems surrounding 
the claims of contemporary evolutionary psychology, including their claims about the hi-
story of the social sciences and their denial of the autonomy of social sciences.
23 Such as Cavalli-Sforza/Feldman 1981, Boyd/Richerson 1985, Durham 1991, Richerson/
Boyd 2005, or Jablonka/Lamb 2005 and the niche construction theory of Odling-Smee/
Laland/Feldman 2003.
24 Consult Weingart/Kroll/Bayertz 1988 on counter-selection, and Simpson 1953, Weber/De-
pew 2003 on the Baldwin effect.
25 See Weingart/Kroll/Bayertz 1988: 84–87.
26 See Ludmerer 1972, Kevles 1985, Barker 1989, Paul 1995: 40–49..
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